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Abstract 
 
We examine the introduction of the voluntary filing program (VFP) by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission  (SEC)  for  the  introduction of  XBRL  (eXtensible Business  Reporting Language), or 
Interactive Data as called in the US. XBRL is a machine-readable standardized format for financial 
reports. The VFP  allowed firms to file annual and quarterly reports using XBRL. This program 
represents a quasi-natural  experiment to isolate the effects of an improvement in the information 
environment of program participants. We study two documented effects of voluntary disclosure (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001), reduced cost of capital  and increased information intermediation. Our results show a 
decrease in the cost of capital, especially for  financial and IT firms, and an increase in information 
intermediation. These effects support existing literature on the adoption of IT in firms and voluntary 
corporate disclosure and sheds light on the decision to be an  early adopter of XBRL reporting 
technologies. 
 
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, Information, Cost of Capital, Financial Reporting. 
  
1 Introduction 
 
How does the adoption of technological innovations by firms translate into increased economic value if at 
all? Previous IS literature have studied this question thoroughly, using different measures (cf. Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson, 1996) and analyzing different kinds of IT investments. The IT innovation that we are 
focusing on is the  introduction of a standardized format for corporate filings, called Interactive Data. 
Recent developments in IT have facilitated increased financial information transparency over the last 
decades. This change has translated  into easier access for investors and regulators to financial reports 
and firm disclosure, for example via the  Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system 
(EDGAR) system. The increased automation of the process has also led to reduced time and cost of 
filing financial reports. The Internet and other communication technologies have also led to an enormous 
decrease in the time and expense of accessing and analyzing  financial reports and other valuation 
relevant disclosure. Our goal in this paper is to apply existing measures of economic success on a quasi-
natural experiment. We specifically analyze the economic effects of a  voluntary  filing program  (VFP)  
for  the  introduction  of  eXtensible  Business  Reporting  Language   (XBRL),   or Interactive Data as it is 
called in the US. XBRL is an Extensible Markup Language (XML)  based format which is geared 
towards financial information and allows tagging of this information using standard taxonomies. We 
expect that this exogenous variation has short-term effects on the returns and liquidity of participating 
companies as well as more long-term effects on their cost of capital and their following analysts. 
In April 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulating authority in the US, 
introduced a VFP for the introduction of XBRL, designed to make financial reports more accessible and 
to reduce the cost to prepare and analyze these. On April 13th, 2009, the SEC made the filing in 
Interactive Data format  compulsory by adopting rule 33-9002 (SEC, 2009). The mandatory SEC 
program was implemented by a staggered introduction over three years. In the first year, large U.S. 
“Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” (GAAP) filers with a public float over $5 billion were 
required  to  use  Interactive  Data.  In  the  second  and  third  year,  the  rest  of  U.S.  GAAP  and 
“International Financial Reporting Standards” (IFRS) filers followed. The SEC's goal by adopting XBRL 
is to enhance transparency and to facilitate investors' financial reports analysis. The machine- readable  
format  significantly  enhances  the  speed  of  financial  statement  analysis  by  investors. Transparency  
may be  increased with XBRL usage as investors can electronically download and analyze reports in 
a standardized  structure and format with pre-defined semantics and taxonomies (dictionary of terms). 
They are able to use information directly from financial statements in financial applications  with  little  
data  transformation  and   interpretation.  However,  the  SEC's  regulatory requirement that all public 
companies use XBRL was introduced with little analysis of the impact of XBRL on firms and markets. 
In this paper, we study the effects of voluntary early adoption of Interactive Data. Specifically, this paper 
investigates the market effects after the introduction of Interactive Data, which qualifies as an instance of 
voluntary corporate disclosure. We test two hypotheses found in the literature of possible effects of 
voluntary disclosure. These are more precisely reduced cost of equity capital and increased information 
intermediation.  Our results are statistically significant on the reduction of the cost of capital of the 
participants as well as  on increased information intermediation. We believe that our proposed research 
questions are interesting and relevant for researchers as well as practitioners. Our analyses will shed 
light on the question how voluntary interactive disclosure influenced firms' costs of capital and access to 
information by investors. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the examined hypotheses with 
respect to related work. Section 3 provides information on the data and the sample selection process. 
Section 4 explains the methodology used. Section 5 provides results and section 6 finally concludes. 
 2 Hypothesis Development 
 
In this section, we discuss the economic and technical improvements for bot h participating firms and 
investors that want to gather information about this firm. Furthermore, we s how that the introduction of 
XBRL qualifies for an action of voluntary disclosure of corporate inform ation since it makes the filing  
information  accessible  more  easily.  Therefore  it  serves  as  a  sig nal  for  better  corporate 
government and innovation of the company. This connects our study to a la rge body of literature on 
voluntary and non-voluntary corporat
e 
disclosure of information, for insta nce the introduction of 
accounting standards in firms. The economic implications of voluntary discl osure have already 
been 
thoroughly analyzed in accounting literature, but are also playing a more vital role in IS since the 
disclosure of financial information as well as the retrieval have become easier and more 
automated. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Exemplary Filing in HTML Format 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Exemplary Filing in Interactive Data Format 
 
From the perspective of investors, Interactive Data enhances various asp ects of their work 
with 
financial data. Formerly, firms submitted an html file and a pdf docume nt of their report to the 
EDGAR  system.  An  exemplary  statement  of  income  of  Pepsi  Co.  is  s hown  in  Figure  1.  
The 
 introduction of Interactive Data has made it possible to find, analyze, and compare financial data of 
participating companies in the “Interactive Financial Report Viewer”, as depicted in Figure 2. But next to  
the  apparent new  features of  the  new  platform, the  standardized format  itself  offers  various 
opportunities for  analysts and traders. Using the old format, analysts had to go through financial 
reports manually to find a specific value and copy and paste it into their spreadsheet or database. The 
voluntary provision of financial reports in Interactive Data format facilitates the work of analysts since it  
makes  financial  information  automatically  processable  and  comparable.  This  might  play  an 
important part in the decision of analysts whether to cover a specific stock in their analysis or not. 
 
2.1 XBRL Literature 
 
The literature on XBRL has been growing in the last years and involves various aspects of the topic, 
such  as  quality assurance and  technical  issues. Assurance issues involve extensions of  standard 
taxonomies which hinder the comparability of reports as well as errors in the reports filed. Boritz and No 
(2008) analyze the quality of XBRL filings and suggest a quality assurance program to validate the filings. 
Debreceny et al. (2005) point  out several technical research directions concerning XBRL, among 
others new taxonomies, financial statement assurance, and interoperability issues. 
Research on the economic effects of XBRL introduction is still relatively sparse. One line of literature 
analyzes  company  characteristics  of  voluntary  early  filers.  Premuroso  and  Bhattacharya  (2008) 
examine whether early and voluntary participants of the voluntary filing program demonstrate superior 
corporate governance and operating performance relative to their non-participating peers. Callaghan and 
Nehmer (2009) find that participating companies are bigger, less financially leveraged and have lower 
corporate governance rating.  They conclude that the companies voluntarily adopt XBRL in order to 
improve their corporate governance appearance. As from interviews with business managers in Canada, 
Germany, South Africa, and the U.S. (cf. Pinsker and Li, 2008), companies that introduce XBRL were 
further expecting to attract a broader group of investors and lower cost of capital. 
Another line of literature concentrates on the direct effects of voluntary XBRL filing. Yoon et al. (2010) 
examines whether XBRL adoption reduces information asymmetry in a stock market context. Hodge et al. 
(2004) show that XBRL increases market transparency. We contribute to the second line of literature. We 
are not able to control for the selection bias of participating companies, but rather characterize the 
overall effect on the participating company with respect to their cost of capital and the number of analysts 
following. 
Additionally, we further analyze different groups of participants to detect the groups benefitting most from 
the  early adoption. From the very different motives of VFP participation (as presented by Callaghan 
and Nehmer, 2009, and Pinsker and Li, 2008), we assume different motives for companies of  different  
industry   groups  and  of  different  degrees  of  innovation,  for  example  Information Technology 
companies  compared to Utilities companies. Specifically, IT companies and financial service 
companies seem to have  stronger incentives to participate in the VFP in order to acquire knowledge 
on XBRL in advance and to have the know-how to offer and consult their clients. 
 
2.2 Cost of Capital 
 
The measurement of the economic value of information systems has been an important and prevailing 
research question during the last decades. We apply a classic event study methodology as formalized by 
MacKinlay (1997) and applied by Subramani and Walden (2001). The latter analyzed the impact of 
electronic commerce  initiatives on the market value of companies using abnormal returns. Event 
studies  have  become  an  established method  to  measure  the  success  and  economic  value  of  IT 
investments and the announcements thereof. While previous literature has concentrated on the short- 
term effects of IT investment on returns several days after the event, our study also considers long- 
term effects on the cost of capital of VFP participants. 
The cost of capital hypothesis states that companies increase their level of voluntary disclosure to 
reduce adverse selection risks for investors. A theoretical analysis is provided by Easley and O'Hara 
(2004), who analyze how private and public information affect the cost of capital. For firms with a low 
 level of public information in relation to private information, investors require higher returns to offset 
uncertainty about asset returns and uninformed investors are disadvantaged to informed investors who are 
better  able to incorporate new information in their investment decision. Thus, a firm's cost of capital 
increases with the level of private information. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) present empirical evidence 
that the cost of  equity  capital decreases with an increase in the transparency of annual reports. In 
line with these results, Gray et al. (1995) state that the primary goal of firms is to lower the cost of capital. 
They do this by voluntarily disclosing information and thereby reducing “information risk” and investor 
uncertainty about the quality of the firm and the expected returns from its securities. Therefore, we expect 
positive abnormal returns on a short-term basis after the filing of the first XBRL report and a significantly 
lower level of cumulative abnormal returns long-term as a sign for lower cost of equity capital. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The voluntary introduction of Interactive Data leads to a decreased cost of equity capital for 
participants. 
 
We measure abnormal returns with two different asset pricing models, the market model as in Fama and 
French (1969) and Fama-French Three-Factor Model (cf. Fama and French, 1997). 
 
2.3 Information Intermediation 
 
The second hypothesis on information intermediation captures the positive effects on investors and 
analysts.  Existing research on corporate disclosure suggests a negative relationship of information 
disclosure and information asymmetry (cf. Lang and Lundholm 1996; Leuz and Verrechia 2000). A 
higher level of voluntary disclosure enables more analysts to access and aggregate information. This 
increases the number of analysts following a specific stock. As indicated above, Interactive Data has 
several advantages for analysts and investors. It enables them to follow a specific stock more easily 
and therefore attracts more analysts. Furthermore, voluntary disclosures also might help lesser known 
firms to make investors aware of their existence, as modeled theoretically by Merton (1987). Thus, H2 is as 
follows: 
 
H2: The number of analysts following increases with the introduction of Interactive Data. 
 
Lang  and  Lundholm  (1996)   indicate   increased  investor  following  with  a   higher  score  of 
informativeness of a firm’s disclosure policy. Fang and Peress (2010) find that breadth of information 
dissemination has an influence on stock returns. They discover an economically significant return 
premium on stocks with no media coverage. Such a return premium can also affect the cost of equity 
capital. We adopt the measure of Lang and Lundholm (1996), number of analysts following, as proxy for 
information risk. 
 
 
3 Data and Sample 
 
Market data is used from Compustat and Thomson Reuters Tick History. For the identification of the 
participating companies, we use the report data from the 162 participating companies between April 4, 
2005 and March 23, 2009 from the SEC website. The data cleaning is described in Panel A of Table 1. We  
exclude companies, like trust funds and ADRs (American depository receipts) since we are interested 
in  effects of increased information and transparency proxied through Interactive Data on common 
stocks. We also remove firms with mergers, stock splits or other kinds of corporate actions (reverse 
splits, etc.) during our estimation period in order to exclude distorting effects in our data. Our final data 
sample consists of 92 US companies from 10 different industry groups, as shown in Table 1, 
Panel B The companies were listed both on the NASDAQ and NYSE and filed their first XBRL report 
between April 4, 2005 and March 2009. The number of reports increased constantly, from 27 reports 
between April 2005 and March 2006 to 254 reports between April 2008 and March 2009 (cf. Table 1, 
 Panel C). The number of first reports, i.e. the number of starting participants, was also 
steadily increasing in this period of time. 
 
Panel A: Sample Creation Procedure 
Sample Change Number of Companies 
All filers between April 4, 2005 and March 23, 2009 
 
162 
All companies without trust funds (35) 127 
Companies with available RICs (8) 119 
Companies without ADRs (19) 100 
All data available and non pink-sheets (2) 98 
Without Stock splits (6) 92 
Panel B: Industry Groups 
Industry Group Industry Group ID Number of Companies 
Materials 1000 8 
Consumer Discretionary 2000 8 
Consumer Staples 3000 6 
Health Care 3500 8 
Energy 4000 10 
Financials 5000 13 
Industrials 6000 14 
Information Technology 8000 17 
Telecommunication Services 8600 1 
Utilities 9000 7 
Total Number of Companies 
 
92 
Panel C: Report Counts 
Year Apr-Mar Number of reports filed Number of first reports filed 
2005/06 27 5 
2006/07 105 15 
2007/08 192 21 
2008/09 254 51 
Total Number of Reports 578 
 
 
Table 1. Event Study Sample 
Distribution 
 
Table 2 depicts distributional characteristics of participating companies. From Compustat, we 
collect per-share  data for daily close prices in dollars (Close), daily P/E ratios (P/E), and 
daily market capitalization in  millions of dollars (Market). NEst denotes the number of analyst 
estimates in one month. The participating companies range from big companies like General 
Electric and Microsoft to smaller companies like Bowne &  Co. and ICU Medical Inc. They 
belong to ten different industry groups,  with Information Technology,  Energy, and  Financials 
representing the largest groups of participating companies (cf. Table 1, Panel B). 
 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Std. Dev. 
Close 40.245 2.324 357.395 24.599 34.698 47.304 37.822 
P/E 16.948 -110.726 202.047 8.424 14.152 18.996 39.003 
Market 29,817 58 335,447 4,895 10,909 25,577 54,736 
NEst 33.861 1 109 21 34 45 18.274 
 
Table 2. Distributional Characteristics of Participating 
Companies 
 
For the analysis on information intermediation, we use earnings estimates from Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), specifically one-year ahead and two-year ahead EPS 
estimates as well as the forecasted  long-term growth rate. Additionally, we cluster our sample 
into groups. Firstly, we analyze the firms in the industry group “Information Technology and 
Finance” (ITFI) and firms not in this group (non-ITFI) separately.  Secondly, we distinguish 
between the first filers in an industry 
 (FIRST) and those participants who are not (non-FIRST). We do this to determine if there are 
industry and time idiosyncratic effects. 
 
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use an event study and a panel regression. The event 
study measures  the effect of a voluntary XBRL introduction on the cost of equity capital of a 
company which represents the financing opportunities of investments and innovations in the 
future. Information intermediation is important since it represents the information asymmetry 
between investors and firms. Thus, higher information  intermediation caused by an easier 
information retrieval can lead to an increase in analysts following the specific stock. 
 
4.1 Cost of Capital: Event Study 
 
Event studies have become commonly used instruments to identify and measure the impact of 
the announcement  of  new,  value-changing  information  on  stock  returns.  We  apply  an  
event-study methodology as described in MacKinlay (1997). In detail, different asset pricing 
models are fitted to measure  abnormal stock returns during the event windows in order to 
test for differences in the distribution of abnormal returns. The null hypothesis for these tests is 
that the event has no impact on the distribution of  returns. The filing of the first Interactive 
Data report is set as Day 0 for each participating company and we measure the OLS model 
coefficients during the estimation period (day 
-211 to -11) in order to compute expected returns and thereby cost of equity capital. The 
prediction errors during different event windows (13 days from day -10 to +2, 21 days from day -
10 to +10, and 
41 days from day -10 to +30) can be interpreted as the abnormal returns during these periods, 
more 
precisely   =    − [ | ]. The event windows are relatively short in order to avoid  
other
 possible events that might influence stock prices. The first filing with XBRL is taken as our event date
 
since we do not have information on firms' announcement dates for their participation in the 
SEC's voluntary   XBRL  filing  program.  Starting  ten  days  before  the  actual  event  captures  
possible announcement  or  information  leakage  effects  in  this  period.  Our  results  are  
robust  to  different estimation and event windows. 
We follow the standard event-study methodology, which compares the difference of abnormal 
returns before  and  after the event. Abnormal returns are computed with the market model by 
Fama et al. (1969) and the Fama-French Three-Factor Model (cf. Fama and French, 1997) in 
order to calculate expected returns and cost  of capital. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) is implemented to ensure robustness and yields similar  results. The statistical market 
model serves as a basic model which “relates the return of any security to the return of the 
market portfolio” (cf. Fama et al., 1969): 
  =   +    +   
 
with Rit and Rmt being the return in period t of security i and of the market portfolio respectively.
 
The Fama-French Three-Factor Model falls into the category of multifactor risk models. It 
introduces 
three risk premia, the equity risk premium (ERP), equal to the difference of the market risk 
premium and the  risk-free rate of return (the excess return of the market rm-rf), the “small 
minus big risk premium” (SMB), as the difference of return of small- and large-cap portfolios, 
and the “high minus low risk premium” (HML) estimated historically as the difference of high and 
low growth portfolios. We use the Fama-French factors as provided on
 Kenneth R. French's website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html,  accessed  date:  
2011-12- 
01) and estimate the factor coefficients bi, si, and hi  using the following regression 
model: 
  =   +    −   +   +   + 
 
           

Daily abnormal returns are summed up to cumulative abnormal returns,   ,   = ∑     = 

 
  − [ | ], in order to measure the aggregate effects of the event. We apply robust standard test
 statistics as proposed in Patell (1976) to measure the statistical significance of the CARs.
 
 
4.2 Information Intermediation: Panel Regression 
 
In order to analyze whether the introduction of XBRL facilitates information intermediation, monthly 
number of EPS forecasts serve as a proxy for the number of analysts following the specific company and 
therefore for the attractiveness of the stock. We aggregate the number of all monthly estimates from  
I/B/E/S  (NEst)  and  perform  a  panel  regression  on  this  data  by  using  a  dummy  variable 
representing the time before and after the introduction of XBRL: 
, =   + , + ,
 
where m denotes the month and i the cross section. To test the impact of VFP participation on
 
information intermediation, a panel regression with firm fixed effects is estimated (firm dummies are not 
reported for brevity) and tested using robust standard errors (cf. Arellano, 1987). 
 
 
5 Results and Interpretation 
 
In the first part of our analyses, we event study results using cost of capital models (the market model and 
Fama French Three-Factor Model) to test the hypothesis that the SEC's voluntary filing program 
decreases the cost of capital. Firms are further clustered by industry group, specifically Information 
Technology and Financials  (ITFI) and other industry groups, and by being a first adopter in an 
industry. We assume stronger motives for these industry groups to participate in the program, since the 
introduction of XBRL can have strategic relevance for these firms, for example consulting expertise, and 
therefore the participation might have a  stronger effect on these firms. In the second part, we conduct 
a regression analysis in order to show the  effect of XBRL introduction on the number of analysts 
following the specific stock. 
 
5.1 Cost of Capital 
 
Table 3 provides results for the explicit cost of capital models. Panel A shows results with the market 
model, and Panel B gives the results based on the Fama French Three Factor Model. Focusing on the 2 
day event window, the results yield positive (though no significant) short-term abnormal returns after the 
first filing of  XBRL. While the average CARs are higher for non-ITFI firm, we cannot make inferences 
from the results.  The variation of the estimation and event window does not provide different results. 
For the results on the more long-term cost of capital, we find significant results for an event window of 41 
days and the industry groups ITFI. For this subsection, both models have negative coefficients and all are 
significant at the 5% level. We thus conclude that voluntary XBRL filing leads to a reduction in the cost of 
capital by. Since results are not significant for the other industry groups, leading to the conclusion that 
filers in the ITFI group experience a stronger negative effect on their cost of capital than other industry 
groups. The effect of the first XBRL filing is also shown in Figure 
3, which also demonstrates a clear downward tendency of CAR for ITFI group firms. 
Furthermore, we carry out the same analysis with the group of firms being the first filer in their 
industry  group and those which are not. From the results, we can observe significant and positive 
short-term  abnormal returns for first adopters as compared to non-first adopters which experience 
negative or at least insignificant abnormal returns.  As for the cost of capital that we infer from more long-
term abnormal returns,  we find significantly lower cost of capital than before the first XBRL 
filing for non-first adopters, while the returns of first adopters are still positive and significant. This 
result is also evident from longer event windows. Therefore, we infer two opposing effects for the 
groups.  First adopters seem to experience a positive effect on their abnormal returns. On the other 
 hand, non-first adopters have decreasing effects on their cost of capital which is reflected by the long- 
term abnormal returns and higher level of transparency. This means that inv estors are willing to get less 
compensation for their investment into the firm. 
 
Panel A: Market Model 
Event window IT, Financials N Average CAR p-value 
[-10;2] all 92 0.0586 0.5757 
[-10;2] 0 62 0.0619 0.6278 
[-10;2] 1 30 0.0517 0.7789 
[-10;10] all 92 -0.1035 0.3235 
[-10;10] 0 62 -0.0081 0.9492 
[-10;10] 1 30 -0.3006 0.1102 
[-10;30] all 92 -0.2417 0.0227 ** 
[-10;30] 0 62 -0.1402 0.2739 
[-10;30] 1 30 -0.4514 0.0193 ** 
Panel B: Fama French Three-Factor Model 
Event window IT, Financials N Average CAR p-value 
[-10;2] all 92 -0.0046 0.9650 
[-10;2] 0 62 0.0109 0.9321 
[-10;2] 1 30 -0.0365 0.8429 
[-10;10] all 92 -0.1595 0.1296 
[-10;10] 0 62 -0.0491 0.7003 
[-10;10] 1 30 -0.3875 0.0422 ** 
[-10;30] all 92 0.2332 0.0227 ** 
[-10;30] 0 62 -0.1194 0.3509 
[-10;30] 1 30 -0.4684 0.0155 ** 
***: significant on a 1% level / **: significant on a 5% level / *: signifi cant on a 10% level 
 
Table 3. 
 
Event Study Analysis of Abnormal Returns Grouped by Indust ry Group 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of XBRL on CAR (Fama-French Three-Factor Model, by Industry Group) 
 Panel A: Market Model 
Event window First Adopter N Average CAR p-value 
[-10;2] all 92 0.0586 0.5757 
[-10;2] 0 81 -0.0233 0.8345 
[-10;2] 1 11 0.6613 0.0507 * 
[-10;10] all 92 -0.1035 0.3235 
[-10;10] 0 81 -0.2162 0.0551 * 
[-10;10] 1 11 0.7266 0.0346 ** 
[-10;30] all 92 -0.2417 0.0227 ** 
[-10;30] 0 81 -0.3598 0.0017 ** 
[-10;30] 1 11 0.6284 0.0612 * 
Panel B: Fama French Three-Factor Model 
 
Event window 
 
First Adopter 
 
N 
 
Average CAR 
 
p-value 
[-10;2] all 92 -0.0046 0.9650 
[-10;2] 0 81 -0.0965 0.3877 
[-10;2] 1 11 0.6723 0.0475 ** 
[-10;10] all 92 -0.1595 0.1296 
[-10;10] 0 81 -0.2931 0.0100 ** 
[-10;10] 1 11 0.8248 0.0194 ** 
[-10;30] all 92 -0.2332 0.0227 ** 
[-10;30] 0 81 -0.3830 0.0009 *** 
[-10;30] 1 11 0.8700 0.0148 ** 
***: significant on a 1% level / **: significant on a 5% level / *: signifi cant on a 10% level 
 
Table 4. 
 
Event Study Analysis of Abnormal Returns Grouped by First Adopters 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Impact of XBRL on CAR (Fama-French Three-Factor Model, by First Adopters) 
 
 
 
5.2 Information Int rmediation 
 
Table 5 provides results that the introduction of XBRL leads to a significa ntly increased number 
of 
analyst  counts, proxied  
by 
the  
number 
of  monthly  analyst  estimates  fr om  
I/B/E/S. 
We  find  a 
 significant increase in analyst counts consistently for all industry groups. This is consistent with 
our expectation that the introduction of XBRL enables more analysts to acquire information and 
therefore increases the supply of analysts covering a stock. The introduction of XBRL however 
does not have significantly  positive results on the monthly number of analysts following an 
ITFI company. This again supports the assumption that this industry group is driven by other 
motives that might not be captured by our chosen  economic measures. Especially for 
companies in the industries financial services and IT, there are  incentives  such as a 
consulting purposes and investment opportunities to voluntarily adopt XBRL.  Additionally, filing 
through Interactive Data can have had two possible effects. First, our hypothesis, that it 
increases information intermediation. However, it can also reduce the  number  of  analysts  
covering a  specific  stock  since  information is  more  easily  retrieved by investors themselves. 
Our results indicate that this is  not  the case and investors still seek analysts' advice, since the 
number of analyst estimates are consistently increasing for all firms. 
 
Group Estimate Standard Error p-value 
All 1.84939 0.8950 0.0388 ** 
Non-ITFI 1.99969 0.9726 0.0399 ** 
ITFI 1.52201 1.8965 0.4223 
***: significant on a 1% level / **: significant on a 5% level / *: significant on a 10% level 
 
Table 5. Results of Analysts Counts 
 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This study analyzes the effects of a participation of firms in a voluntary SEC program for the 
reporting through  XBRL. In April 2009, the SEC made the program compulsory and the 
program is being implemented through a staggered introduction over three years. However, it 
is still unclear what the effects of reporting with XBRL were on financial markets. We derive two 
hypotheses from existing literature. Previous studies  suggest that voluntary disclosure reduces 
the cost of equity capital and increases information intermediation.  In our study, we conclude 
that voluntary filing has positive effects for participating companies. We find significant results 
on a medium-term level for the cost of capital using different asset pricing models for the 
industry groups IT and Financials. This fits in our presumption of stronger motives for specific 
industry  groups  to participate in the program, such as consulting  expertise.  However,  we  do  
not  find  any  short-term  effects  for  this  group.  For  the differentiation of first adopter within 
one industry, we find positive abnormal returns for this group as compared to other adopters, but 
in the long-term, this effect of being the first in one industry does not reduce the cost of capital as 
for the other participants. Our results on information intermediation show an  increase  in  analyst  
coverage  after  reporting  with  XBRL  through  the  SEC's  voluntary  filing program, proxied by 
I/B/E/S estimates counts. 
We contribute to previous literature on the economic success of IT investment with our analysis of 
the cost  of  capital  of  firms  as  well  as  the  proxy  for  information  intermediation.  
Additionally,  we contribute to existing XBRL literature which does not take a closer look on the 
economic effects, such as cost of capital and information intermediation, of the early voluntary 
introduction of XBRL in the US. Our results raise further questions whether voluntary adaption 
has had other effects than those we analyzed which might justify the decision of early voluntary 
adoption or whether participation might even have been harmful for participating companies, 
considering costs involved in an early adoption. Future research might involve more in-depth 
study of information intermediation and analysis of the effects on the cost of equity capital 
using implied  cost-of-capital models. Further studies can also include an analysis of the 
mandatory introduction of Interactive Data by the SEC and the differences in the effects of 
voluntary and mandatory introduction. 
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